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IN THE SUP·REME CO·URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONSTANCF: H. BARRETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
--vs.-
ROBERT MICHAEL BARRETT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No.10268 
BRIEF O·F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce wherein the plaintiff 
hy her complaint seeks a divorce, custody of the minor 
child of the parties, support money, alimony, and a di-
vision of property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court determined that the plaintiff was en-
titled to and granted her a divorce, awarded her cus-
tody of the minor child of the parties, the sum of $200.00 
each month as support money for the minor child, the 
sum of $250.00 until her death or remarriage as alimony, 
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judgment in the sum of $1:::i,OOO as a division of property, 
and $1,750.00 as attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal is taken by the defendant and seeks a 
determination by this romt that the plaintiff has not 
proved grounds for clivorce in the manner required by 
law, and that her complaint shoulcl have been dismissed; 
or in the alternative, that the award to the plaintiff of 
the sum of $250.00 each month as alimony and $5,000 of 
the $15,000.00 judgment awarded to the plaintiff was 
excessive as a matter of la\v and should be vacated ancl 
set aside. 
STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action were married on October 
21, 1961, at Acapulro, Mexico ( R. 94, L. 20). The plain-
tiff at the time of this marriage had four children by a 
previous marriage betweeu the ages of nine and two years 
(R. 96, L. 1-5 ), having been divorced from her former 
husband in April of 19GO (R. J31, L.11-15). The defend-
ant had had two prior marriages, and had three children 
by his first marriage and one child by the second (R. 96, 
L. 25). At the time of this marriage, the plaintiff was 32 
years of age, and the defendant was 49 years of age ( R. 
115, L. 11-14). Following the marriage, the parties took 
up residence in Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 99, L. 2-5). The 
parties separated little more tha11 three months following 
their marriage, in the latter part of .Jannary or the first 
part of February of l9G2 (R. 136, L. 17-22), and the 
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plaintiff returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties 
Imm been separated since 1\Irs. Barrett left Las Vegas 
(R. 136, L. 23-25). A child was was born to the parties on 
.Jnne 19, 1962 (R. 99, L. 19). This action \vas commenced 
011 M ny 8, 1963, in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Following the framing of issues and employment of dis-
covery procedures hy the parties, a pretrial was held J\fay 
18, 1964, the pretrial order reciting in part (R. 48) : 
''In this case the defenda11t will not offer contra-
dictory e\-idence if the plaintiff can show grounds 
for divorce, provided that his failing to so offer 
will not be consiuered hy the court as a basis for 
any punitiYe measures to be taken against him in 
the division of property or awarding of alimony 
or support.'' 
The pretrial order also recited that the property agree-
mrnt entered into by the parties at the time of the mar-
riage and written in Spanish (R. 29) was correctly inter-
preted in English in the defendant's Objection to Plain-
tiff's ~lotion for Production of Documents (R. 35, 36). 
The matter was tried August 6, 1964. The plaintiff 
commenced her testimony, and in support of her claim 
of cruelty testified in generalities which were primarily 
condnsiom; (R. 99, L. 26 to R. 100, L. 20) as to the "in-
considerate, tyrannical and dictatorial" behavior of the 
clefemlant, then qualified her testimony with justifica-
tion of the defendant's behavior (R. 100, L. 21-24) and his 
pro hlems leading to it. When asked to testify specifically, 
the plaintiff refused (R. 100, L. 26-29, 30; R. 101, L. 29; 
R. 102, L. G, 21-22; R. 103, L. 1, 2, 18-20). When pressed 
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by her counsel and by the Court for specific testimony 
concerning her claimed grounds, the plaintiff stated that 
she did not want a divorce ( R. 103, L. 14; R. 104, L. 10). 
The Court then stated that the complaint was dismissed 
(R. 104, L. 12). After further conversation, a recess was 
taken and upon resumption of testimony the plaintiff 
was asked again if she wanted a divorce. At this time 
she repeated that she did not (R. 104, L. 30; R. 105, L. 
20-22, L. 30). After discussion between the Court and 
her counsel, the plaintiff again testified as to the justi-
fication of the def end ant's claimed acts of cruelty ( R. 
108, L. 30 to 109, L. 4; R. 109, L. 28 to R. 110, L. 3). The 
plaintiff then testified as to an occasion (R. 111, L. 22 to 
R. 112, L. 12) which apparently was being developed as a 
claimed act of cruelty. However, when asked by her 
counsel the somewhat leading question (R. 113, L. 4): 
Q. Did you feel that you were frequently im-
posed upon sexually in your home~ 
The plaintiff replied: 
A. That's very a difficult question. I enjoyed 
for the most part my 
Q. Did you find . . . 
A. . .. sexual encounters with Mr. Barrett. I 
did feel on a few occasions that he was ani-
mal ... rather animal like in his approaches, 
hut that's ... 
Q. All right. 
On this state of the record, the Court interposed as fol-
lows (R. 113, L. 22): 
THE CouRT: lt may be that counsel will stipulate 
that grounds for (livorce have now been shown. 
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MR. BELESS: I will stipulate - what was that, 
Your Honor1 
THE CouRT: That the lady has shown grounds 
which would support and sustain a divorce. 
l\In. BELEss: Yes, I will so stipulate. 
THE CouRT: All right. Let's get on to the matter 
of finances. 
!\In. Mcl\IunnAY: The real problem. 
The plaintiff then testified that at the time of her mar-
riage to the def enclant she had been employed as secre-
tary to the department head of the State Department of 
Public Instruction and was earning $350 a month (R. 115, 
L. 4). Prior to that she had been the Assistant Manager 
of the Alpine Rose Lodge earning $400 a month, together 
with $50 a month expenses (TR. 114, L. 26). At this 
time she had a <laughter two years of age-"Old enough 
to put in the nursery" (R. 134, L. 1). She owned an 
interest in certain real property acquired in the divorce 
from her former husband, which she valued at about 
$7,000 (R. 114, L. 10). She was receiving, and presently 
receives $50 per month support money for each of her 
four children by her previous marriage, or $200 each 
month. In addition she receives $50 each month if and 
when she moves from the property owned by herself and 
her former husband jointly (R. 115, L. 25). The plain-
tiff testified that her present living quarters were "so-
cially a devastating situation" (R. 120, L. 6) and that 
she had found an apartment which she felt was adequate 
for "large family" (R. 122, L. 9, 18) which rented for 
$200 a month. Realizing that this was not all Mr. Bar-
5 
rett's family (R. 122, L. 10) she felt that it would he 
reasonable that he contribute only three-fourths or $150 
(R. 122, L. 29) of this rent. 8he then testified that ·was 
she really needed was a home adequate for herself and 
Michelle ''and the other children'' ( R. 123, L. 2) and 
requested that the court award her sufficient monies to 
purchase one. The plaintiff then teRtified to her modest 
needs, which included, among other items, ( R. 123, 12,1, 
125 ), $150 a month for food for she and the minor chikl 
(R. 123, L. 26) and $30 to $100 for miscellaneous ac-
tivities, recreation, etc. (R. 125, L. 4-6). However, it is 
significant that the plaintiff testified that as to her four 
children by the lH'evious marriag0 "their father pro-
vides for them adequately'' by paying the sum of $50 for 
each child as child support (R. 121, L. 3). Apparently, 
the plaintiff is in good health, and she testified that the 
child ·was in good health (R. 139, L. 22). Although she 
was employed prior to this marriage, she does not feel 
at this time that she has any reason to seek employment 
(R. 133, L. 7, 13). The plaintiff then testified aR to the 
a<'quisition of a diamond ring (R. 126, L. 10-24). The 
ring was purchased January 12, 1862, (R. 159, L. 4) ap-
parently, a matter of two to four weeks (R. 136, L. 17-22) 
before the plaintiff left the clefe1Hlant and returned to 
Salt Lake City. The defendant's version of this pur-
chase was somewhat different than that of the plaintiff. 
·when asked if the ring had been purchased as a ·wedding 
ring, he stated (R. 158, L. 21): 
"No. It was purehasf~d agai11Rt my will. I mYed 
money, and that 'NaR more or less 0110 of these un-
kind things, lm;'i11g big liomes an cl big rings." 
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E\·ide11ee \ms then adduced with reference to the 
financial situation of tlte defendant (Exhibits P-4, P-5 ). 
\Yhile the defendant has substantial assets, the record 
<loes 11ot iw1icate that he is the "retired multimillionaire" 
that the plaintiff assumed she \ms marrying (R. 115, L. 
20). These ('XhihitR show that Barrett Investment Com-
pany, of whieh the defendant is for practical purposes 
the sole stockholdN, had a negatiYe net worth and 
\ms inclehted to the clefenclant in an amount slightly less 
than 011e a11cl 011e-half million dollars. Exhibit P-5 list-
ed varionR assets owned by the clef endant, all of which 
are shown hy tl1e Exhibit to lw pledg<'d as security for a 
loa11. 'l'he net af',sets haw~ a book yalue or $255,084.87, 
Rnhjert to the note of the defendant in the amount of 
$141,624.72. 'l'he def enc1ant teRtifiecl as to his lack of u 
n•g-ular inrome (R. 150, L. 23), his obligations ( R. 151, 
L. fi-29), and the lnck of present values in the real estate 
de:-;crihcd i11 Exhibit P-5 (R. 153, L. 2-8). The court 
fouwl as a F'inding of Fart that the defendant "had prop-
erty interests and holdings exceeding $1,250,000. '' (R. 
75). Plaintiff's counsel qurstionecl the defendant at some 
l<•ngth coneerning vohmtary proYisions he had made for 
his chil<lreu hy his previous two marriages (R. 144, L. 
3 to R. 14G, L. 12). These provisions for his older chil-
<heu lrnd heeu made years previous to the trial of this 
present action and under different financial, as well as 
p0rno11a1, eircumstanees, the most recent being in April 
of 1935 (R. 14G, L. 2). While it would appear that these 
matters ~were entirely immaterial, nevertheless they were 
rPlierl npon by the court and received its first attention 
in n dt'tnmination of the issueR upon the parties sub-
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mitting the matter (R. 163, L. 21). At the conclusiou 
of the evidence the court awarded the plaintiff the sum of 
$15,000, $250 a month alimony, $200 a month support 
money, attorneys' fees in the sum of $1,750. The dia-
mond ring was awarded to the defendant. 
Following the entry of judgment, counsel for the de-
fendant filed his withdrawal (R. 82). Present counsel 
entered his appearance (R. 79), and a .Motion for New 
Trial was filed (R. 81). Plaintiff's Motion for a New 
Trial was denied (R. 87), and the plaintiff was allowed 
to reopen and give testimony concerning the antenuptial 
agreement entered into by the parties at the time of the 
marriage (R. 168-201). The court found the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff (R. 196, 197), finding that the 
agreement was unfair "for the wealth Mr. Barrett had" 
(R. 196, L. 28), and further that the plaintiff did not 
understand the agreement (R. 197, L. 1). The defendant 
thereupon filed this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE 
STIPULATION OF COUNSEL THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAD, BY HER TESTIMONY, 
SHOWN GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE; AND IN 
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH STIPULATION, 
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS EWl1ITLED TO A 
DIVORC:BJ. 
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The controlling statute, with reference to grounds 
for divorce and proving of the same, 30-3-4 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, is as follows: 
'' 30-3-4 PLEADINGS - FINDINGS - DECREE. - The 
complaint shall be in writing and signed by the 
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney. No decree of di-
vorce shall be granted upon default, or other-
wise, except upon legal evidence taken in the cause, 
and all hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
had before the court, and not before a master, 
referee or any other delegated representative, 
and the court in all divorce cases shall make and 
file its findings and decree upon the evidence." 
(Emphasis added) 
Upon the evidence adduced in this matter, as reflected 
in the transcript herein, the court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The finding made by the 
court with reference to the plaintiff's grounds for divorce 
is as follffws (R. 74, 75): 
'' 5. The plaintiff and defendant resided together 
as husband and wife for a period of approximate-
ly five months following their marriage. Almost 
immediately following the marriage, and particu-
larly when it became apparent that the plaintiff 
was pregnant, the defendant's attitude towards 
her took on a marked change. No longer was the 
plaintiff the object of the defendant's love, affec-
tion and attention, but instead she found herself 
rejected, cast aside and treated with contempt. 
The defendant on more than one occasion threat-
ened the plaintiff with physical harm and injury 
which he was quite capable of inflicting. The de-
fendant has refused to continue to reside with 
the plaintiff, has insisted upon a divorce and wants 
nothing more to do with the plaintiff. All of the 
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foregoing conduct on the part of the defendant 
has and does constitute cruel treatment of the 
plaintiff and haR caused her great mental <listress 
and anguish. Counsel for the partieR stipulated 
that the foregoing constituted grounds for 
divorce.'' 
It is submitted that the foregoing facts, as found, are 
not supported, and in fact are in large measure negated 
by the record in this case. Further, it is suhmitteu that 
the concluding statement of this finding, to-wit, "Coun-
sel for the parties stipulated that tlrn foregoing consti-
tuted grounds for divorce'' enlarges upon the purported 
stipulation ·which was stated by the court as follows 
(R. 13, L. 22): 
''THE CouRT: It may be that counsel will stipu-
late that grounds for diYorce have now been 
showu.'' 
It would seem apparent that the attempted stipulation 
was not and was not intended to he an agreement by the 
parties, that the plaintiff had, in fact, made out the 
grounds for divorce as cited in this fimliug, but was 
rather in fact an admission by the court and counsel 
that grounds for divorce had not been made out, could 
not be made out at this stage of the record unless the 
plaintiff were to impeach her owu testimony, and that 
the stipulation ·was in lieu of evid0nce rather than an 
acknowledgment that evideuce hau been produced. rrhe 
court itself appeared to acknowledge this state of the 
record, in halting cross-examination of the plaintiff by 
counsel for the defoud::rnt coneerning- lic·r trips to Salt 
Lake City during tlw marriage as follows (H. UG, L. 5): 
JO 
'' 'l'HE CouRT: Why are we leading into this~ Are 
we trying to show that she is not entitled to di-
vorce? You could talk me out of it if you want to. 
J\In. BELESS: I just want to show that her relation-
ship ~s still in Salt Lake City and really what this 
marriage was ... 
J\ln. ~Ic.MunRAY: Well then, I object to it because 
he has already stipulated there is grounds for 
divorce so all we ought to be talking about are 
matters that pertain to property matters. 
THE CouRT: I think so.'' 
Present counsel is concededly in the unhappy position 
of attacking a purported stipulation made by his prede-
cessor, and apparently relied on by the court. However, 
it is submitted that the matters attempted to be stipu-
lated to in this instance are not the type of matter ordi-
uarily stipulated to by counsel a11d to which stipulations 
counsel, his client, and any successor counsel should as 
a matter of proper practice be bound. The attempted 
stipulation in this instance was one which, under the 
statute, counsel is "·ithout authority to enter into, and 
the court is ~without authority to accept. Such a stipula-
tion is not as in the ordinary case, an agreement by all 
parties as to existing facts, but under the circumstances 
of the instant case is an admission that the necessary 
facts do not exist, or in any eYent have not been proven, 
aml is routrary to the wording as well as the spirit of 
the statute, which requires as a matter of public policy 
that no decree of diYorce shall be granted other than 
"upon legal evidence taken in the cause." The plaintiff 
havi11g completely failed to prove, either that she was 
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entitled to or wanted a divorce, was not entitled to the 
granting of one, and the complaint should have been dis-
missed as the court itself indicated in the early stages of 
the proceedings (R. 104, L. 12). 
POINT II. 
THE COUR.T ERR.ED IN AW ARD ING TO THE 
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY IN THE SUM OF 
$250.00 EACH MONrrH UNTIL HER DEATH 
OR. RE.MAR.RIAG E. 
This court has on numerous occasions made the ob-
servation that on the question of alimony, while each 
case relies substantially on its own facts, and that the 
decision of the trial court should he given great weight, 
that nevcrtheleess, this court has authority to modify a 
decree in appropriate cases. See Pinion v. Pinion, 67 
Pac. 2nd 265, 92 Utah 26;), McDonald Y. McDonald, 236 
Pac. 2nd 1066, 120 Utah 573, and the numerous cases 
therein cited. In each of the cases cited, this court has 
set out the elements which should he taken into con-
sideratio11 by the Court as governing its discretion in this 
regard. In applying these elements in turn to the facts 
of the instant case, no authority is found for the grantin~ 
of alimony, and particularly permanent alimony, under 
a fact situation as is here presented. 
The elements to be co11sidcrcd in determining the 
question of alimony include the amouut and kind of prop-
erty ff\Vned by each of the parties and whether the prop-
erty belonged to the parties before coverture or was ac-
cumulated jointly, the ability and opportuuity of each of 
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the spouses to earn money, the financial station and 
necessities of each party, the health of the parties, the 
duration of the marriage, what the wife might have given 
up by the marriage, and age of the parties when they 
married. 
In this case, the court found the defendant to have a 
net worth of $1,250,000. The plaintiff owns an undi-
vided interest with her former husband in certain Salt 
Lake County real property, which she valued at $7,000. 
All of the property of each of the parties was accumulat-
ed prior to the marriage, and no property was accumulat-
ed by the parties during the marriage. At the time of 
the marriage, the plaintiff was employed as Secretary 
to the department head of the State Department of Pub-
lic Instruction, and was earning $350.00 per month (R. 
115, L. 4). Prior to that she had been the assistant man-
ager of the Alpine Rose Lodge and was earning $400.00 
per month, together with $50 a month expenses (R. 114, 
L. 126). At this time she had a daughter two years of 
age - "old enough to put in the nursery" (R. 134, L. 1). 
The standard of living enjoyed by the plaintiff during 
the brief period that the parties lived together, does 
not appear clear from the record, though as the court 
stated in Pinion v. Pinion, supra, "He would not be 
obligated in this sort of a marriage to keep her for the 
duration of her life to this standard.'' The marriage in 
Pinion v. Pinion lasted four years, this marriage lasted 
less than four months. With reference to the other ele-
ments to be considered in the determination of the ques-
tiou of alimony, the plaintiff gave up nothing other than 
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The plaintiff came into this marriage a woman who 
was required. to work to support her four children by a 
marriage that had ended in divorce. Within four months 
8he left this marriage and returned. to Salt Lake City. 
With reference to what the plaintiff might have 
"given up" for this marriage, during the short period 
of time that ihe parties resided in Las Vegas, the plain-
tiffmade an undetermined number of trips to Salt Lake 
City (R. 135, L. 1). The plaintiff could not recall that 
the defendant objected "a great deal" to these trips 
though H8 to her trips during the Christmas holidays he 
"may have been offended" (R. 125, L. 25-28). Also, on 
the day that the plaintiff and defendant separated, the 
plaintiff telephoned her former husband in Salt Lake 
City (R. 110, L. 9-14) and requested that he send her 
ear down. The Court refused to allow the defendant's 
counsel to examine the plaintiff concerning these trips, 
the plaintiff's relationship in Salt Lake City, and the 
actual status of this marriage for the reason that grounds 
for divorce had been stipulated to (R. 136,, L. 5-15). 
A distinguishing factor in this ease is that there is a 
child horn of the marriage. However, the defendant has 
i1e'l-er denied his obligation to support this child, and has, 
i11 fact, agreed to pay an amount as child support sub-
stantially in exeess of the amount which the plaintiff feels 
is adequate for the support of her children by the first 
marriage. It would seem obvious that the child of this 
marriage will not be raised in the same household with 
her half sisters \\'ith a pecuniary standard of living four 
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times that of the other ehilclren, and the defendant is 
well aware that his coutrihution to the support of this 
chil<l will undoubtedly, iu fact, contribute to the ·welfare 
of the plaintiff's children b~, her former marriage a8 
well as the plaintiff herself. This ·would appear inevi-
table, and an attempt to arrange the situation othenYise 
·would probably not be in the best interest of this child 
or anyone else involved. 
However, under the circumstances anrl. the facts of 
this case, the award granted hy the trial court goes far 
beyond doing equity to the parties and instead attempts 
to apply a pecuniary balm to the sensitivities of the 
plaintiff, apparently found by the trial court to have been 
bruised in some manner whi.eh the record leaYes far from 
clear. 
POINrr TII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
PLAINTIFF THE SUl\i OF $15,000.00 AS A DI-
VISION OF PROPER'l'Y. 
The plaintiff testified (R. 123, L. 4-20) that because 
of her circumstances she uecdcd a home and that (R. 
123, L. 10). 
"I suppose with the equity I have in Spring Lane, 
it is possible to obtain, that our determination of 
$17 ,000 should be enough.'' 
Q. You are asking i he court to a ward. you a suffi-
cent amount which coupled with the equity you 
now have to give yon a home? 
A. Yes, I would appreciate it, yPs. 
16 
The court in rendering a decision (R. 164, L. 26) stated: 
''I thought he ought to give her $10,000 towards 
the buying of a home. She has a $7,000 equity in 
this duplex that she now has, and maybe a little 
more than that with these parcels of land because 
she owns half of two parcels and only a third in 
the one.'' 
After further discussion and argument the court stated 
as follows (R. 165, L. 17): 
''THE CouRT: I think I ought to give her $15,000. 
'I'hat would pay her well. Her station in life has 
been changed by marrying him, the hopes she had 
of living and shining and wearing this diamond 
around. I think she is well taken care of if I give 
her $15,000, $250 a month alimony while she is 
single, $200 a month support for the child, give 
the gentlemen the ring, and give her counsel fees, 
costs in the amount of $1750, ano wish them 
God speed. I ·would do about as well as I could 
do this. That will be the order of the Court.'' 
ln Foreman v. Foreman, 176 Pac. 2nd 144, 111 Utah 
72, this court set out in its opinion the language of the 
trial judge as follows: 
''As far as I am concerned, she has $1,800 in 
cash and I think that would well pay the lady for 
such heart balm as she might be in need of, and 
that would avoid the necessity for my going into 
that.'' 
To this and other language of the trial court quoted, this 
court observ0d: 
"It would seem from a reading of the above state-
ments that what the court was attempting to do 
17 
here was compensa tc i\f rs. Foreman for her suf-
fering of the paugs of m1requited love- heart 
lJalm - and tearh l\lr. Foreman a lesson in mar-
riage. Neither task is properly \Yithin the issues 
of a diYorce case such as this.'' 
The language of the trial jrnlge quoted ahon· lrns a 
striking similarity to the s!atc>me11t of tlH~ same trial 
judge in the instant ease. Tl1e *10,000 award first cou-
templated by the court "·as co11sin1ed by the court to he 
paymcut for the valm' of the dimnoud rillg acquired li;· 
the parties during the mmTiag('. ·while the eirenm-
stanees under which tlw riug wns acqnire<l \\'l'l'C' soml'-
what in dispute (Cf. R. Hi-J-, L. :22; R. 126, L. 17), eoncl•d-
ing for the pnqiose of argmnent tlia! tl1<' court acted 
withiu the bounds of its discretion in tnrnnling the plain-
tiff the \'al ne of this i·ing, or $10,000, the rero11sider<1 ti on 
by the court, and th0 gratuitous inrn•m'.<' of this amom1t 
to $13,000, noh\·itl1:-;tarnli11g that the plaiutiff herself 11ml 
testified that the amount needed hy h<>r to purcha;;.:p a 
home was $10,000, \ms an attempt lo (as the rourt itself 
stated) "pay h0r well," similar to that nitieizcd and re-
,·ersr•cl hy this ('Onrt in Fore111011 ,,._ Fure.mm1. 
In conrlusion, i! is sul:mittPcl tl1nt tliP reeord in this 
rase cloes uot support th<> fii:diug- nf the trial conrt that 
the plaintiff had eFdahlished grounds for divorce aml 
accon1ingly, thC' ('OmplniJJt of tl1t' plaintiff shonld haw 
been dismiss0d. In t ]Jp ;d tern a tin, t11 is record does not 
support a finding that the plaintiff \\'as elltitle<l to an 
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award of alimony nor an award of property to the plain-
tiff as was awarded by the trial court. The matter should 
Le remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint 
of the plaintiff. In the alternative, the award to the 
plaintiff of the sum of $250 each month as alimony should 
be vacateu and set aside, and the award of $15,000 given 
the plaintiff as a division of property should be reduced 
to the sum of $10,000. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
LEE W. HOBBS 
1119 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorney for .Appellant 
19 
